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THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE NEW DEAL,
AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL ORDER
Michael E. Parrish*
Shortly before the 1932 election, which brought Franklin D. Roosevelt
to the presidency and the New Deal to America, Supreme Court Justice
Harlan F. Stone returned home after a dinner party at the White House,
where he and other members of Herbert Hoover's "medicine ball" cabi-
net had dined with the beleaguered incumbent. Stone's law clerk, Herbert
Wechsler, found the Justice in a very reflective mood that evening and
inquired what he was thinking about. "Well," said the former dean of the
Columbia Law School, "what I'm thinking about mainly is that I guess
we won't be dining very much at the White House any more." Wechsler
asked if the Justice viewed that prospect with regret. "Yes, I do. But not
with surprise. If I told the President once I told him many times, he was in
danger of forgetting that it was the common people of this country who
elected him." I Hoover's aristocratic opponent, who helped to extend the
benefits of the American legal order to the common men and women of
the country, seldom made the same mistake.
Nearly thirty years ago, the dean of legal historians, J. Willard Hurst,
wrote that the main thrust of American law in the nineteenth century had
been to "protect and promote the release of individual creative energy to
the greatest extent compatible with the broad sharing of opportunity for
such expression.' '2 If that is so, then the main thrust of American legal
development in the twentieth century has been to adapt those basic con-
cepts to an interdependent, urban, industrial society. The era of the Great
Depression and the New Deal marked an important milestone in the quest
for a new relation between law and human happiness which would, in
Hurst's apt phrase, "give men more liberty by increasing the practical
range of choices open to them and minimizing the limiting force of cir-
cumstances. "3
Prior to FDR and the New Deal, the American legal order afforded
abundant liberty for the wheat farmers of Kansas to sell their crops below
the cost of production. There was ample freedom for entrepreneurs who
wished to form larger and larger units of production, but very little for the
* Professor of History, University of California, San Diego; B.A., 1965, University of Califor-
nia, Riverside; Ph.D., 1968, Yale University; Liberal Arts Fellow, Harvard Law School (1973-74).
I. K. LOUCHHEIM, THE MAKING OFTHE NEW DEAL: THE INSIDERS SPEAK 55 (1983).
2. J.W. HuRST, LAW AND THE CONDrIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNrrED
STATES 6 (1956).
3. Id.
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individual industrial worker who desired collective bargaining; sufficient
liberty for the floor traders on the stock exchange who manipulated the
value of securities, but far less for the ordinary investor who sought reli-
able information about a corporation's balance sheet. The practical range
of choices open to the white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant graduates of the
nation's best law schools was infinitely greater than the opportunity avail-
able to Jews or Roman Catholics from the same institutions. Even the
stock market crash of 1929 did not affect everyone equally. The wealthy
seldom felt the pinch of the limiting force of circumstances. The same
could not be said for the nation's elderly, its unemployed, or its many
children who labored in the mines and mills of Alabama and North Caro-
lina. As many legal historians have pointed out, the American system
often encouraged rapid economic growth at the expense of social justice
and economic equality.
Until the pioneering work of Hurst and his disciples, especially Law-
rence M. Friedman4 and Harry N. Scheiber, 5 historians described the
nineteenth century American legal order as devoted to laissez faire eco-
nomics and the defense of vested property rights. But as these scholars
and others demonstrated, nineteenth century American law accorded
much greater protection to entrepreneurial property interests than to ren-
tier ones. In addition, the states and their legal institutions played a funda-
mental role in promoting economic growth during the nineteenth century
and in allocating the costs and benefits of the social disruptions produced
by the railroad, the factory, and the commercial integration of the na-
tional economy.
The degree of legal intervention and coercion varied, of course, rang-
ing from the harsh slave codes of the Old South and the law of eminent
domain to the bankruptcy statutes and the rules of contract law. Histori-
ans have, for the most part, rejected the traditional view of the state as a
slumbering power that permitted market forces to go unchecked. Most
legal historians now perceive that even the primitive governmental ma-
chinery of the nineteenth century could be an important instrument of
economic development and planning. The most serious debate in nine-
teenth century legal history today does not rage over the extent of state
intervention, but over the question of which socioeconomic groups bene-
fited from the rules of both public and private law. 6
4. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 157-247 (1973).
5. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: the United
States 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST 232 (1973).
6. In some articles, notably M. HORwrrz. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 31-252
(1977), and to a lesser extent, Scheiber, supra note 5, and L. FRIEDMAN. supra note 4. scholars argue
that the legal rules favored the commercial classes and large-scale developers at the expense of farm-
ers, artisans, and the working class. This view has been challenged in. inter alia. Simpson. The
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Historians' reconceptualization of the nineteenth century American le-
gal order has led to a reconsideration of law and the state in modem
America. The origins of administrative law, redistributive social pro-
grams, and a concern for economic planning lie not in the progressive era
of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, as once thought, but in the
final decades of the nineteenth century. 7 The old liberal synthesis, which
posited a continuing legal struggle between big business on the one hand
and selfless, idealistic reformers on the other, began to lose credibility in
light of modem research. 8 Many historians now argue persuasively that
corporate leaders and their legal advisers played important roles in the
drafting and implementation of many reforms and that businessmen and
middle-class progressives shared a common ideology rooted in their con-
cern for economic efficiency and social order.
Historians have also challenged the cherished belief that American po-
litical life is characterized by sharp, cyclical swings between periods of
liberal reform and conservative reaction. This paradigm lost validity as a
way of characterizing the early days of this century, once scholars began
to reexamine the 1920's, to rehabilitate such figures as Herbert Hoover,
and to rediscover the many similarities between that era and its progres-
sive past and New Deal future. 9 Few historians today would, like their
predecessors in the 1950's, gloss over the ideological and class conflict
present in American society. Nevertheless, there is also less of a tendency
to regard the New Deal as "a third American revolution,' 0 which de-
parted fundamentally from the public policies of earlier eras.
Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1979); Freyer, Reassessing the
Impact of Eminent Domain in Early American Economic Development, Wis. L. REV. 1263 (1981);
Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: a Reinterpretation, 90 YALE
L.J. 1717 (1981). On the general debate, see Presser, "Legal History" or the History of Law: A
Primer on Bringing the Law's Past into the Present, 35 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1982).
7. See M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
289-587 (1978); J. GARRATY, THE NEw COMMONWEALTH, 1877-1890 (1968).
8. S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION
MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959); G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965); G.
KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916
(1965); G. MCCONNEL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1961); R. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN
AND REFORM; A STUDY OFTHE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (1962); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER,
1877-1920 (1967); Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era,
55 PAC. N.W.Q. 157 (1964).
9. J.H. WILSON, HERBERT HOOVER: FORGOTrEN PROGRESSIVE (1965); Degler, The Ordeal of Her-
bert Hoover, 52 YALE L. REV. (1963); Leuchtenburg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in
CHANGE AND CONTNrUry IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 81-143 (J. Braeman, R. Bremner, and E.
Walters eds. 1964); Link, What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's? 65 AM. HIST.
REv. (1959).
10. See C. DEGLER, OUT OF OUR PAST: THE FORCES THAT SHAPED MODERN AMERICA 379-413
(1959).
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The New Deal was a product of both radical and conservative ideas and
was attacked vigorously from the Right and Left. Two decades ago. many
New Left scholars portrayed the New Deal as a conservative effort to
prevent change, failing to appreciate the many institutional barriers to re-
form which Roosevelt's administration faced, exaggerating the American
people's desire for more drastic innovations, and to some degree
undervaluing the changes that did occur.II The New Deal was conserva-
tive to the extent that many of its key leaders, including FDR, began their
careers in an earlier era and drew inspiration from the public policies of
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. It was radical, however, in
that it brought to fruition many programs that had been only dreams in the
progressive era and in so doing frequently incurred the enmity of the rich
and the powerful. Felix Frankfurter and other New Dealers may have
wished to save American capitalism from the follies of the Left but the
decade's genuine conservatives regarded them as cunning agents in an
insidious plot to sovietize the American system. Some historians have
also ignored legal ideas and institutions that worked to neutralize the New
Deal's effectiveness. By emphasizing the many legal changes initiated by
the New Deal, scholars have also tended to slight important developments
on the state level and to ignore the entire field of private law, where con-
servatives, not New Dealers, often held the upper hand.
The New Deal initiated or accelerated five important changes in the
American legal order. The first, arising from the administration's con-
frontation with the Supreme Court, was a "constitutional revolution" in
1937, which permanently and dramatically changed the role of the judi-
ciary. Instead of invoking the due process and commerce clauses to veto
progressive laws, which it frequently did between 1880 and 1937. the
Court retreated to the more secure redoubt of statutory construction,
abandoning the attempt to veto national economic policy. The justices
continued, however, to engage in an active retail trade in this area of the
law, despite their growing preoccupation with civil liberties and their fre-
quent invocation of judicial restraint. 12
The second change was the elevation of the presidency, already revital-
1I. Bernstein. The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reforn. in To%% ARDS A
NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (B. Bernstein ed. 1968): NEw DEAl. TIOUGttT
(H. Zinn ed. 1966); Auerbach, New Deal. Old Deal. or Raw Deal: Some Thoughts on New Left
Historiography. 35 J. SOUTH. HIST. 18 (1969).
12. Many of FDR's appointees, who had condemned the judicial activism of the 1930's. were
themselves notorious offenders in this regard. Justice Felix Frankfurter, a loyal New Dealer and the
leading theoretician of judicial restraint, displayed extraordinary broken field running through the
statutes in cases such as United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). where he and the majority
granted labor unions sweeping immunity from both antitrust prosecutions and injunctions sought by
the federal government.
726
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ized by Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Herbert Hoover, to
the pinnacle of power within the political system. FDR was not able to
create an "imperial presidency" through the New Deal. His efforts re-
ceived several notable setbacks at the hands of Congress and the Supreme
Court. Further, many of his largest accretions of executive power were
the result of World War II, not the New Deal. Nevertheless, his mastery
of the radio, his superb political skills, and the Executive Reorganization
Act of 193913 enormously enhanced the prestige of the presidency. With
Roosevelt's tenure the White House became the focus of popular dissatis-
faction with the nation's economy, foreign policy, and moral tone.
The third change, manifested in the extraordinary growth of federal
grant-in-aid programs, the Social Security Act of 1935,14 and in the ef-
forts of the Department of Justice to protect civil rights under the old
Reconstruction-era statutes, 15 was the significant modification of Ameri-
can federalism. For the first time, the national government became the
chief custodian of both economic security and social justice for all citi-
zens. While the New Deal never centralized power in Washington to the
extent that its critics feared or many of its supporters desired, by 1940 the
federal government stood at the fiscal and administrative center of a com-
plex web of intergovernmental relationships that bore little resemblance
to the neat models of "dual federalism" outlined in turn-of-the-century
textbooks on American government.
A fourth change ratified the triumph of state capitalism under the man-
agement of a bureaucratic elite drawn from the legal profession, the aca-
demic world, and big business. This change was distinguished by the re-
vitalization of established independent regulatory agencies such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the birth of new ones including the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications
Commission.
The final change arose from the New Deal's impact upon the legal pro-
fession. This occurred in two ways. First, by recruiting many young law-
yers for government service, the administration broke the occupational
monopoly held by large, private law firms and opened up new avenues for
the pursuit of power and status within the profession. Second, by expand-
ing the domain of administrative law, the New Deal challenged the domi-
nant orthodoxies of legal education and professional practice, which had
13. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1939, 53 Stat. 1423, 1431 (1939) eliminated by Act of Sept. 6, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 554, 80 Stat. 378.
14. Social Security Act, ch. 531, Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976)).
15. See, e.g., Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1982, 1987-1992 (1982)).
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long emphasized the superiority of judicial institutions and the common
law over legislatures, independent regulatory agencies, and statutes.
FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT
As a consequence of the "constitutional revolution," the 1930's closed
one chapter in America's legal history and opened a new one. The New
Deal years marked the end of the era of substantive economic due process
and dual federalism. At the same time, they marked the beginning of an
era of judicial concern for raising the standards of criminal justice and
protecting the civil liberties and civil rights of those whom Justice Harlan
Stone referred to as "discrete and insular minorities."1 6 The New Deal
era was also distinguished by the Roosevelt administration's conflict with
the Supreme Court, which climaxed a struggle over the constitutional sys-
tem.
The conflict between the President and the Court had its roots in the
end of the nineteenth century, when the justices first asserted broad au-
thority to shape the country's economic arrangements. They did so by
balancing the power of government to regulate property and contract rela-
tionships in the public interest against the right of individuals to remain
free from state intervention. Beginning in the 1870's, some justices
adopted an expansive reading of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause and a narrow construction of Congress' constitutional interstate
commerce and taxation powers. Influenced by Jacksonian ideas of entre-
preneurial individualism, equality, and state sovereignty, they restricted
the scope of both state and federal intrusion into the sphere of private
economic decision making. They also denied the states the authority to
regulate most private business firms, except those "affected with a public
interest" such as railroads and other public utilities. 17 And even with re-
spect to these corporate interests, the Court became the final arbiter of
valuation issues and rate-making. 18 It frustrated adoption of a federal in-
16. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Many scholars regard
this case as the rhetorical turning point of modem constitutional development. In Carotene Products.
the Court sustained the federal Filled Milk Act, ch. 262, Pub. L. No. 513, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1976)), against claims that Congress had exceeded its authority to
regulate interstate commerce and had deprived manufacturers of valuable property rights without due
process of law. Where statutes concerned 'ordinary commercial transactions," Stone wrote for the
majority, the Court would insist only that the legislatures acted upon some rational basis. 304 U.S. at
152. Where the law touched political rights or others protected by the first nine amendments, how-
ever, the Court might insist upon weightier justification. Id. at n.4.
17. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923): Munn v. Illinois. 94
U.S. 113 (1877).
18. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. R.R. v. Minnesota.
134 U.S. 418 (1890).
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come tax until passage of a constitutional amendment in 1913,19 vetoed
state and federal laws that attempted to prescribe minimum standards for
employment, 20 and hampered the initial attempts by the federal govern-
ment to break up manufacturing monopolies. 21
Other justices, heirs to the radical Republican tradition of moral reform
and positive government, remained far more sympathetic to state efforts
at economic manipulation and redistribution. Their reading of the Consti-
tution helped to sustain state regulation of working conditions for certain
workers, especially women, 22 permitted national regulation of local eco-
nomic activities that affected interstate commerce, 23 allowed Congress to
prohibit the use of such commerce for many deleterious purposes, 24 and
sanctioned taxation for regulatory as well as revenue purposes.
25
In short, the Court had developed two parallel and contradictory lines
of jurisprudence. These two lines both reflected and managed the tensions
between a vanishing social order of localism, individualism, and volunta-
rism on the one hand and on the other a new regime of national economic
integration, collectivized work, and systematic planning produced by
massive demographic changes and the rise of big business. As the nation
entered the worst economic depression in its history, the justices had not
resolved this fundamental doctrinal conflict. Still, they possessed enor-
mous flexibility on most issues that might come before them for resolu-
tion. By invoking prior decisions that limited governmental control over
the economy, they could resist many efforts at further social reform. But
they could also accomodate change by looking to those precedents that
had sustained government intervention in the past. Thus, the "constitu-
tional revolution" of the decade arose less from the articulation of new
doctrines than from the eventual triumph of older ones.
The doctrinal tensions on the Court were reflected in its membership.
Four devout conservatives, James McReynolds, George Sutherland, Wil-
lis Van Devanter, and Pierce Butler, distrusted most manifestations of
governmental regulation and preached a robust version of judicial activ-
ism to prevent it. Three liberals, Louis Brandeis, Harlan Stone, and Ben-
jamin Cardozo, advocated judicial restraint in order to foster govermmen-
19. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), and 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
20. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918); Adairv. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
21. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
22. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915).
23. Minnesota Rates Case, 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Houston, E. & W. Tex. R.R. v. United States
(Shreveport), 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
24. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321
(1903).
25. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
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tal regulation of the economy. Nevertheless, only one, Cardozo, truly
sympathized with the New Deal. Two "swing" justices, Charles Evans
Hughes and Owen Roberts, appeared to vacillate between fear that the
government would be too weak to prevent a general economic collapse
and fear that it would become too strong to resist managing private prop-
erty completely.
The marked divergence in the Court's membership was a fairly recent
phenomenon. FDR's immediate predecessor, Herbert Hoover, appointed
Hughes, 26 Cardozo-the outstanding state jurist of his time-and Rob-
erts-a middle-of-the-road Republican from Pennsylvania, who had won
the enthusiastic endorsement of many reformers for his role in the prose-
cution of the Teapot Dome scoundrels. "I do not believe there are any
skeletons in his mental closet," remarked Felix Frankfurter at the time of
Roberts' appointment. "Facts will find a ready access to his mind.' '27
Thanks to Herbert Hoover, therefore, the New Deal programs were pre-
sented to the most progressive Court in several generations.
Hughes' Court initially fulfilled many of these liberal expectations with
a series of decisions in 1934-35 that endorsed a generous conception of
governmental power. The new Chief Justice himself wrote the Court's
opinion in Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell,28 where five of the jus-
tices upheld a state mortgage moratorium against objections that it vio-
lated private rights of contract. In Nebbia v. New York, 29 Roberts swept
away over a half century of precedent that limited the states' power to fix
prices. The same quintet of Hughes, Roberts, Cardozo, Stone, and Bran-
deis upheld the New Deal's monetary policies in a series of rulings30 that
provoked Justice McReynolds to lament: "This is Nero at his worst. The
Constitution is gone. "31
26. Although twenty-six senators voted against Hughes' confirmation because of his past Wall
Street connections, Hughes had given liberals good cause to think that he would be far more tolerant
of governmental experimentation than his predecessor, William Howard Taft. As an associate justice
between 1910 and 1916, he had authored both the Minnesota Rates Case, supra note 23, and Shreve-
port, supra note 23, and dissented in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). where the majority
invalidated a Kansas law prohibiting "yellow-dog" labor contracts on the grounds that the regulation
deprived employers of liberty of contract. As New York's progressive governor, he had once ob-
served that "we are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." See S.
HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1951): THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (D. Danelski & J. Tulchin eds. 1973).
27. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (May 22, 1930) (available at Box 171.
Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library).
28. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
29. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
30. Norman v. Baltimore & Oh. R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935): Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S.
317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
31. The McReynolds quote, carried by the newspapers, but expunged from the official record, is
730
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None of these early disputes, however, concerned the scope of con-
gressional, presidential, or federal administrative authority, with the ex-
ception of the Gold Clause Cases. 32 When such issues emerged clearly in
1935-36, the Court's honeymoon with the New Deal ended abruptly. On
"Black Monday," May 27, 1935, the justices toppled two important
New Deal laws, the controversial National Industrial Recovery Act, 33 and
the Frazier-Lemke Farm Relief Act. 34 They also curtailed FDR's power
to remove members of the independent regulatory commissions without
specific approval from Congress. 35
A year later, in addition to vetoing the administration's basic agricul-
tural program, 36 and the Guffey Bituminous Coal Act, 37 the justices ad-
ministered a stem rebuke to the new Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 38 and encouraged disgruntled shareholders to sue corporate officers
who did not resist the New Deal's public power efforts. 39 In a closing
salvo, five of the justices again struck down state minimum wage laws.40
In the face of FDR's landslide reelection victory and the introduction of
his plan to reorganize the federal judiciary, the Court reversed its doctri-
nal gears once again. The old pre-1935 majority led by Hughes and Rob-
erts, who had condoned many of the judicial mutilations in 1935-36,
upheld a new minimum wage law, 41 and endorsed the New Deal's land-
mark labor reform in the Jones & Laughlin case.42 Chief Justice Hughes
wrote both opinions, the first laying to rest the hoary doctrine of "liberty
of contract," and the second giving Congress broad authority to regulate
labor-management conflicts that disrupted interstate commerce.
What caused the Court's switch? Although many scholars have tackled
this startling shift in judicial attitudes, there is still no consensus as to why
the Court, especially Hughes and Roberts, engaged in such intellectual
somersaults.
Hughes blamed the New Deal's lawyers for the constitutional imbro-
glio, because, he complained, they drafted sloppy laws that deserved
reported in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 2031 (L. Friedman & F. Israel
eds. 1969).
32. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
33. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
34. Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
35. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602(1935).
36. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
37. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
38. Jones v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n. 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
39. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
40. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
41. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
42. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937).
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judicial burial. 43 Thus, the Court's reversal might be explained by the fact
that statutes were more carefully drafted as the emergency of the Hundred
Days passed and as the administration recruited more experienced legisla-
tive draftsmen. This thesis has some merit with respect to the National
Industrial Recovery Act, which the Court severely criticized in the "hot-
oil" case 44 and the Schechter case, 45 but none at all when one reflects
upon the care with which very good lawyers wrote the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act 46 and the Guffey Coal Act, 47 both of which were struck
down by the Court. 48
Another explanation for the Court's apparent reversal is that there was
no reversal-that before and after 1937 the justices engaged in scrupulous
line-drawing between acceptable and unacceptable regulatory schemes.
One student of the Court has emphasized the consistency in Hughes'
aproach to due process and commerce clause issues from 1910 to 1937.
which by implication rejects the idea that he changed his mind at all. 49
But this explanation glosses over much of the Chief Justice's language in
Schechter and Carter Coal, dismisses the contrary estimate of several
contemporaries, 50 and overlooks Hughes' anti-New Deal posture in cases
such as Butler and Jones. Felix Frankfurter once attempted to rescue Jus-
tice Roberts from charges of expediency, 51 but his effort was unpersua-
sive. 52 When one carefully examines the pattern of judicial vetoes in
1935-36, it appears that the anti-New Deal coalition (which sometimes
included Brandeis as well as Hughes and Roberts) feared most of all the
enhancement of executive power, enlarged federal control over the econ-
omy, and the discretionary authority of federal regulatory agencies. 53 Re-
43. W. SWINDLER, COURT & CONSTITUTION IN TIlE 20TH CENTURY: TIlE NE\\ LEGALITY.
1932-1968 72 (1970).
44. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
45. See supra note 33.
46. Guffey-Snyder Coal Act, ch. 824. Pub. L. No. 10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (repealed 1937).
47. Ch. 824. Pub. L. No. 402, 49 Stat. 991 (1935).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
49. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV L. RE% 34 (1967).
50. After the Jones & Laughlin decision, for example. Justice Stone quipped to his son that "in
order to reach the result which was reached in these cases ... it was necessary for six members of the
Court either to be overruled or to take back some things they subscribed to in the Guffey Coal Act
case." A. MASON. HARLAN FISKE STONE; PILLAR OFTHE LAW 459 (1956).
51. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts. 104 U. PA L. REV 311,313-316(1955).
52. See Chambers, The Big Switch: Justice Roberts atnd the Minihnun-Wage Cases. 10 LAB
HIST 44. 46-73 (1969); Parrish, The Hughes Court. the Great Depression. and the Historians. 40
HISTORIAN, 286-308 (1978).
53. Justice Brandeis told Tommy Corcoran after the Schechter decision,
This is the end of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the
President that we're not going to let this government centralize everything. It's come to an end.
Vol. 59:723, 1984
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form measures that did not sweep as broadly with respect to these three
areas faced far less judicial hostility, even from the Court's hide-bound
conservatives. Shortly before overturning the Agricultural Adjustment
Act,5 4 for example, the justices sustained the Hawes-Cooper Act, 55 which
declared that all convict-made goods shipped in interstate commerce were
to become subject to the laws of the state of their destination. 56 And prior
to the Parrish decision, 57 they also upheld an amendment to Hawes-
Cooper, which made it a federal crime to transport convict-made goods
into any state forbidding their possession or sale. 58
These affirmative uses of federal law to support state policies went
back to the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 59 where Congress banned the
transportation of liquor in interstate commerce if it was intended for use
in any way violating the laws of the state into which it was shipped. The-
oretically, the principles of Webb-Kenyon and Hawes-Cooper had very
broad application. States with the most advanced labor and social welfare
policies, for example, could with federal assistance compel their back-
ward sisters to adopt more progressive laws or risk losing their principal
markets. As a constitutional strategy, Webb-Kenyon and Hawes-Cooper
represented a viable if circuitous route to reform. Unfortunately, the New
Deal failed to exploit its full potential, even after Frankfurter urged the
approach upon Roosevelt when the Court struck down the NIRA. 60 FDR
and many of his other advisers, however, favored more direct methods of
federal control, which triggered greater anxiety among the Justices and
contributed to the impasse of 1935-36.
In the final analysis, both the impasse and its solution were more politi-
cal than doctrinal. Hughes and Roberts, both moderate Republicans,
looked upon many of the New Deal's reforms and some state level pro-
grams as radical, especially with respect to the redistribution of social and
economic power.
Other old progressives, including Newton D. Baker and Al Smith,
fought the New Deal for these same reasons after 1935. By joining with
As for your young men, you call them together and tell them to get out of Washington-tell
them to go home, back to the states. That is where they must do their work.
A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 280 (1960).
54. See supra note 36.
55. Hawes-Cooper Act, ch. 79, Pub. L. No. 669, 45 Stat. 1084 (1929) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 60 1976)).
56. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).
57. See supra note 41.
58. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
59. Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, Pub. L. No. 398, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified at 27 U.S.C.
§ 122 (1976)).
60. Letter from Frankfurter to Roosevelt, May 30, 1935, in ROx.SI-VI-I.T & FRANKFURTIER: TI;IR
CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945 273-74 (M. Freedman ed. 1968).
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the conservative justices in 1935-36, Hughes and Roberts hoped to por-
tray FDR and his advisers as dangerous subversives who were tampering
with constitutional verities. "The words of the Justices carried political as
well as legal significance," noted Attorney General Robert Jackson. "It
was unfortunate, if the majority felt compelled to strike blow after blow at
the President's policy, that this compulsion was concurrent with . . . the
[presidential] campaign." 61 Faced with a choice between an administra-
tion that had arrested the economic decline and a group of Justices who
argued that this administration often behaved unconstitutionally, the vot-
ers placed their immediate self-interest above abstract lawyers' argu-
ments. Roosevelt's landslide left Hughes and Roberts with no alternative
but capitulation.
In bowing to the election returns, however, Hughes became the leader
of the Court's progressive wing once again. He also salvaged the basic
power of judicial review and placed himself and the Court in an impreg-
nable position with respect to the President's misconceived Court-pack-
ing plan. It was a stunning triumph for the Chief Justice, who, unlike
Justice Roberts, accomplished this feat without serious damage to his in-
tellectual integrity. Hughes, the Justice who wrote Miller v. Wilson 62 in
1915, did not find it too difficult to sustain minimum wage legislation two
decades later. And the ideas expressed in Jones & Laughlin63 had already
been given initial shape in the Minnesota Rates Cases64 and the Shreve-
port case. 65 For a Chief Justice as brilliant and as crafty as Hughes, lead-
ing the constitutional revolution in 1937 was as simple as resisting it had
been the year before.
The struggle between Roosevelt and the Court has tended to obscure
other aspects of the justices' work during the decade, work that had pro-
found and lasting significance. Hughes and his brethren afforded impor-
tant new protection in the areas of civil liberties and civil rights. In cases
such as Stromberg v. California66 and DeJonge v. Oregon,67 the Court
significantly enlarged the scope of first amendment rights guarded against
state interference, at a time when such decisions did not command broad
public support. 68 The Justices drove another nail into the coffin of
61. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN
POWER POLITICS 75 (1941).
62. 236U.S. 373 (1915).
63. See supra note 42.
64. See supra note 23.
65. 234 U.S. 342 (1914): see supra note 23.
66. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
67. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
68. See R. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA. 195-236 (1978).
Vol. 59:723. 1984
The 1930's and the American Legal Order
"separate but equal,''69 and provided black citizens with a modicum of
defense against Southern lynch law disguised as due process. 70 The
Hughes Court also broadened the reach of federal habeas corpus actions
to attack constitutionally defective state trials, 71 and greatly expanded the
in forma pauperis docket, which permitted indigent defendants to chal-
lenge their convictions. 72 While certain aspects of economic liberty went
into constitutional eclipse during the decade, the Court extended new lib-
erty to many forgotten Americans. This "constitutional revolution,"
which laid the foundation for the jurisprudence of the Warren Court two
decades later, was as important as the more celebrated revolution of
1937.
THE CHANGING PRESIDENCY
A second significant change brought on by the New Deal can be seen in
its impact on the presidency. Roosevelt's critics, especially the Liberty
Leaguers and later the isolationists, who loathed his economic reforms
and distrusted his diplomacy, accused him of erecting a presidential dicta-
torship. Congress was likewise blamed for abdicating its authority to the
executive branch and to the growing federal bureaucracy, which, critics
complained, subjected local government and private economic interests
to the whims and caprice of radicals in Washington. Like all generaliza-
tions, these contained some measure of truth, but also considerable hy-
perbole.
These claims persisted because it was virtually impossible for most
Americans who experienced the Great Depression and the New Deal to
distinguish the presidency from the man. "Most of us in the Army have a
hard time remembering any President but Franklin D. Roosevelt," re-
marked one G.I. at the time of FDR's death in 1945. "He was the Com-
mander-in-Chief, not only of the armed forces, but of our generation. '73
Roosevelt's aggrandizement of power rested as much upon his own buoy-
ant personality as upon statutes and executive orders. Few political lead-
ers in our history could match his oratorical gifts, his guile in dispensing
patronage, and his deft manipulation of subordinates, opponents, the
press, and Congress. But he was not invincible. We often forget that,
despite his extraordinary charisma, Roosevelt experienced a number of
69. Missouri exrel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
70. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also
D. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OFTHE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).
71. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
72. See Loper, The Court of Chief Justice Hughes: Contributions to Civil Liberties, 12 WAYNE
L. REV. 539, 546-51 (1949); McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief
Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REv. 5, 21-26 (1949).
73. B. ASBELL, WHEN F.D.R. DIED (1967).
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profound setbacks between 1933 and 1939 that clearly limited his power
even during the unparalleled economic crisis of the Depression. The com-
ing of World War II shifted the balance back in favor of presidential
power, but even during the war FDR usually functioned within the
boundaries set by Congress and public opinion.
The period of unquestioned presidential preeminence in the shaping of
domestic policy was remarkably fertile, but also remarkably short-lived.
Throughout the so-called Hundred Days, which lasted from March 4 until
early June of 1933, Congress quickly endorsed dozens of proposals that
flowed from the White House, including a new banking law, 74 and the
first federal securities statute, 75 as well as laws setting up the National
Recovery Administration76 and one expanding the lending capacity of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 77 Acting under the dubious author-
ity of the Trading with the Enemy Act78 from World War I, Roosevelt
banned gold exports and all foreign exchange transactions until Congress
approved the administration's monetary schemes and devalued the dollar
by almost twenty-five percent. 79 By equating the economic debacle with
war, FDR asked for and received from Congress the resources appropri-
ate for a military commander battling a foreign invader.8 0
The off-year elections in 1934 gave Roosevelt even larger majorities in
Congress. This mandate, combined with the defection of many conserva-
tives and the growing challenge presented by Senator Huey Long and oth-
ers, encouraged a second burst of reforms in 1935. Again responding to
initiatives from the White House, Congress adopted the Social Security
Act, 81 the National Labor Relations Act,82 a $4.8 billion relief and public
74. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1976)) (providing for safer and more effective use of bank assets, regulation
of interbank control, prevention of undue diversion of funds into speculative operations).
75. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77 (1976)).
76. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (held unconstitutional
in Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
77. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, ch. 55, Pub. L. No. 35, 48 Stat. 119 (1933)
(repealed 1947).
78. Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, Pub. L. No. 91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified at 50
App. U.S.C. 99 1-43 (1976)) (prohibiting, inter alia, trading in United States with enemy and tran-
sporting enemy to or from United States without a license).
79. Uniform Value of Coins and Currencies Act, Pub. Res. No. 10, 48 Stat. 112 (1933) (codified
in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. (1976)); Gold Commandeering Act, 48 Stat. I. ch. I (1933) (codi-
fied at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)); Gold Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 87. 48 Stat. 337
(1934) (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. (1976)).
80. Leuchtenburg, supra note 9.
81. Social Security Act, ch. 531, Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976)).
82. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. 99 151-169 (1976)).
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works measure, 83 and a significant revision of the federal tax code that
closed many loopholes opened during the 1920's and levied new sur-
charges on the very rich. 84 Despite the Supreme Court's invalidation of
key administration measures, executive power stood at its peacetime zen-
ith after FDR's triumph at the polls.
When Roosevelt attempted to exploit his personal political capital in
1937, however, Congress reasserted legislative independence and admin-
istered its first decisive rebuff to executive power 85 by rejecting the ad-
ministration's ill-advised attempt at Court-packing.The proposed Judicial
Reform Act of 1937 would have added additional justices to the Court for
each one who failed to retire within six months of reaching age seventy.
"Boys," snapped one congressman, "here's where I cash in my
chips." 86 The President's best legal minds, including Felix Frankfurter,
Ben Cohen, and Tommy Corcoran, were not consulted until after the
measure had been sent to Congress. "They're just doing it all wrong,"
lamented Cohen. 87 "The way Roosevelt set it up at first was dishonest
because he didn't state his real reason," recalled Joseph Rauh, Jr. "The
real reason was to change most of the Supreme Court's decisions, and this
crap about . . . 'we just want to have a few more judges because these
judges are overworked' was rubbish."88
The protracted legislative battle over the Court-packing bill blunted the
momentum for additional reforms, divided the New Deal coalition,
squandered the political advantage Roosevelt had gained in the 1936 elec-
tions, and gave fresh ammunition to those who accused him of dictator-
ship, tyranny, and fascism. When the dust settled, FDR had suffered a
humiliating political defeat at the hands of Chief Justice Hughes and the
administration's Congressional opponents. 89 Roosevelt lost more in the
wake of this setback than a few judicial appointments. He lost as well the
initiative on domestic policy to the Congress. Having punctured the myth
of FDR's political infallibility, members of the House and Senate became
more critical of new proposals from the White House and carefully scru-
83. Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, ch. 48, Pub. Res. No. 11, 49 Stat. 115 (1935).
84. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 674, Pub. L. No. 438, 48 Stat. 1178; Revenue Act of 1935, ch.
829, Pub. L. No. 407, 49 Stat. 1014 (1935) (codified in Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
85. Until 1937, Roosevelt and Congress had usually worked in harmony, with the exception of
monetary policy, where FDR had been forced to accept the inflationary nostrums of the silver bloc
(Silver Purchase Act, ch. 674, Pub. L. No. 438, 48 Stat 1178 (1934)) (repealed), and payment of the
veterans' bonus, where Congress had overridden his veto (Adjusted Compensation Payment Act,
Pub. L. No. 425, 49 Stat. 1099 (1936)).
86. Quoted in J. ALsoP & T. CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 67 (1938).
87. K. LOUCHHEIM, supra note 1, at 113.
88. Id.
89. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, Sup. Cr.
REv. 347, 352-99 (1966); J. At.sop & T. CATLEDGE, supra note 86, at 87.
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tinized existing New Deal programs that had stirred controversy, espe-
cially the National Labor Relations Act.
The economic recession of 1937-38 and Roosevelt's attempt to re-
structure the executive branch dealt other blows to presidential prestige
and leadership. After taking credit for the economic upturn before the
election, the President had to absorb the blame for the "Roosevelt reces-
sion," which had been triggered in part by his own desire to trim federal
expenditures and balance the budget. Congress also scuttled his bold
plans to reorganize the executive branch, which rested upon the recom-
mendations of a blue-ribbon committee on administrative management
headed by the renowned Louis Brownlow. The original bill called for the
enlargement of the White House staff, creation of the Executive Office of
the President to include the Bureau of the Budget, and a far-reaching con-
solidation of existing bureaus, agencies, and commissions into twelve su-
per departments, all under the President's control. Even independent reg-
ulatory commissions such as the Federal Trade Commission, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission would have been regrouped under the authority of these ex-
ecutive departments.90
Congressional critics denounced the reorganization plan as another
presidential power grab. Working in tandem with frightened bureaucrats
who hoped to protect their own fiefdoms from the White House, they
easily defeated the proposal's most important features. Roosevelt re-
ceived his Bureau of the Budget and a larger staff, but Congress retained
the upper hand on executive reorganization by means of the controversial
legislative veto. Although the final statute permitted the President to re-
group certain agencies and functions as he saw fit, the legislative veto
provided that his orders might be nullified within sixty days by a concur-
rent resolution of the Congress. 9 1
Roosevelt's political fortunes reached another nadir in the 1938 elec-
tions, when several conservative Democrats won reelection despite
FDR's effort to "purge" them during bitter primary campaigns. Defeated
on judicial reform and executive reorganization, Roosevelt now con-
fronted a well-organized and aggressive conservative coalition in Con-
gress, which resisted most presidential initiatives on domestic policy and
harried many New Dealers with accusations of subversion and un-Amer-
90. B. KARL. EXi;CUTIV- RIORGANIZATION AND REIORM IN rinl Ni,%% )tAl (1963): R. POI N-
BERG, REORGANIZING RoosI-uT's G)Vi;RNMI.NT. Till, CONTROVLRSY OVI R Ext c'  tV- RI.ORANI/A
TION 1936-1939 (1966).
91. R. POLENB-RG, supra note 90, at 79-188 J. HARRI. CONtRItS",oNAI CONIROI OI A)MINIS
TRATION (1964); Milieu & Rogers. The Legilative Veto and the Reorganization At of /939. I Pun
AD RI-v 176-89(1941).
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can activities. 92 The New Deal had been derailed and presidential power
checked at home by the time German troops marched into Austria and
Czechoslovakia. Only in the sphere of foreign policy, a traditional pre-
rogative of the executive, did presidential power remain on the offensive
after 1938. Once "Dr. Win-the-War" replaced "Dr. New Deal," Con-
gress augmented presidential authority to an extent unparalleled during
World War I and the early days of the New Deal, but even as they sanc-
tioned the growth of an "imperial" presidency abroad, opponents in the
Congress dismantled the more controversial and most vulnerable New
Deal programs such as the Farm Security Administration and the National
Youth Administration. 93
THE NEW FEDERALISM
The third important change brought about by the New Deal was a sig-
nificant modification in American federalism. New Deal reforms that
threatened powerful, entrenched economic interests or that attempted to
redistribute social benefits often provoked fervent pleas on behalf of
"states' rights" and angry denunciations of "federal tyranny," but the
changing patterns of intergovernmental relationships became far more
complex during the Depression than these shibboleths suggested. Sharp
confrontations between federal and state interests, of course, took place.
Arizona, angered by the diversion of water from her lands to those of
other states, threatened to use military force to block construction of Par-
92. J. PATrERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM ANDTHE NEW DEAL (1967).
93. Faced with substantial isolationist sentiment in Congress and among the public at large be-
tween 1936 and 1939, Roosevelt attempted to check the Axis powers by means of executive agree-
ments and executive orders that rested exclusively upon his claims to inherent presidential authority
to conduct foreign relations and "command the nation's land and naval forces. Ironically, the same
Supreme Court that attempted to limit presidential authority over the domestic economy provided
much of the doctrinal support for these initiatives abroad in the case of United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), written by none other than Justice George Sutherland.
Once the United States became an active belligerent, Congress rapidly expanded presidential con-
trol over both military policy and the domestc economy in a series of far-reaching statutes, the most
important of which were the renewal of Lend-Lease, ch. 199, Pub. L. No. 9, 57 Stat. 20 (1943)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 412, 415; terminated 1946), the Second War Powers Act, ch. 199, Pub. L.
No. 507, 56 Stat. 176 (1942) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 609q; repealed 1947), the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, ch. 25, Pub. L. No. 420, 56 Stat. 23 (1942) (codified in scattered sections of 50
U.S.C.; expired), and the War Labor Disputes Act. ch. 144, Pub. L. No. 89. 57 Stat. 163 (1943)
(codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.; repealed 1946). By means of these laws. the President
was given the discretion, among other things, to allocate $50 billion of war supplies to America's
allies, to reorganize all executive departments and agencies, to fix rents and prices throughout the
country, and to seize industrial plants closed by strikes. Congress retained a legislative veto in these
areas, but seldom exercised it. As the Second World War drew to a close, executive discretion over
the nation's life and property far transcended the experience of the NRA years.
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ker Dam.94 Harry Hopkins, Federal Emergency Relief Administrator, ter-
minated cooperative federal-state efforts and asserted complete federal
control over state programs in cases of obvious corruption or where the
states failed to make adequate financial contributions to work relief proj-
ects. 95 Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior and head of the Public
Works Administration, waged a titanic struggle with New York Park
Commissioner Robert Moses over the administration and allocation of
funds to build the Triborough Bridge. 96
But the usual, day-to-day interactions between federal and state offi-
cials were not plagued by such conflict or controversy. National Forest
Service rangers enforced state fish and game laws in most western states;
federal and state personnel jointly inspected eggs, butter, fruit, vegeta-
bles, and tobacco, with the inspection fees collected by the states, who
paid the salaries of the federal agents. 97 In 1934, the Bureau of Biological
Survey in the Department of Agriculture eradicated over seven million
disease-carrying rodents in three southern states with an $8.7 million
grant from the Civil Works Administration. Simultaneously, PWA and
WPA funds helped to construct sanitary privies, septic tanks, and sewage
disposal plants in many states in an effort to combat typhoid, malaria, and
hookworm. No constitutional objections hampered these activities, al-
though it is difficult to imagine a more palpable federal intrusion into the
domain of local health activities. 98
Federal responsibility for local economic performance and social ser-
vices did not commence suddenly with FDR's election, but the New Deal
did more than continue the efforts of past administrations. FDR's admin-
istration greatly expanded the breadth of such activities. Its most flexible
and potent instrument became the grant-in-aid, which made federal
money available to the states (sometimes on a matching funds basis) for
specific activities to be administered by state officials working under na-
tional guidelines. The origins of this particular mode of federal-state co-
operation went back to the famous Morrill Act of 1862, 99 which con-
veyed to the states federal lands upon the condition that they be utilized
for the construction and support of colleges and universities. In the
94. See United States v. Arizona, 195 U.S. 174 (1935).
95. See S. CHARLES. MINISTER OF RELIEF: HARRY HOPKINS AND TIE DEPRESSION (1963): Thunder
Over Ohio. 71 SURV 118 (1935); New York Times. March 20. 1935. at 22. col. I: id.. March 24.
1935, at 10, col. 3.
96. New York Times, January22, 1935. at 15.col. 2:id., March 12. 1935. at I.col. I.
97. J. CLARK. THE RISE OF A NEw FEDERALISM: FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 103-04 (1938).
98. H. BITrERMANN, STATE AND FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID 364-65 (1938).
99. Morrill Act, 12 Stat. 503, ch. 130 (1862) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 301 (1976)).
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Weeks Act of 1911,100 Congress extended this concept to include cash
grants to the states for fighting forest fires in the watershed of navigable
streams. Similar grant-in-aid programs flourished during the Wilson ad-
ministration for vocational education, 101 highways, 10 2 and agricultural
extension work,103 but the budget-conscious Republican administrations
of Harding and Coolidge put a cap on new programs during the 1920's. 104
In their own use of the grant-in-aid technique, the New Dealers drew
upon the experience of the Wilson years and the tentative efforts of the
Hoover administration. The Emergency Relief and Construction Act of
1932,105 which Hoover reluctantly approved, made over $600 million in
federal loans available to the states for work relief projects. Although the
guidelines for receiving federal loans and spending them discouraged
many states from applying, this program became the largest single under-
taking through the grant system prior to the New Deal. The new adminis-
tration substituted grants for loans in both the relief and work-relief pro-
grams. By 1940, in addition to these vast relief activities and the
continuation of old programs from the Wilson era, the New Deal had
undertaken landmark grant-in-aid efforts for unemployment compensa-
tion, old-age assistance, child welfare services, and maternity care. The
Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933106 made $3 million available to the states
each year for the operation of public employment offices. Social Security,
the largest New Deal grant-in-aid program, assisted the blind, the dis-
abled, and dependent children through combined federal-state efforts. 10 7
The growth of federal grant-in-aid programs represented the clearest
expression of the New Deal's commitment to "give men more liberty by
increasing the practical range of choices open to them and minimizing the
limiting force of circumstances."' 108 It rested upon the realization that
many social and economic problems required national attention and that
100. Weeks Act, Pub. L. No. 434, 36 Stat. 961 (1911) (codified in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. (1976)).
101. Smith-Hughes Act, ch. 114, Pub. L. No. 347, 39 Stat. 929 (1917) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 11-28 (1976)).
102. Federal Highway Act, ch. 241, Pub. L. No. 156, 39 Stat. 355 (1916) (codified in scattered
sections of 23 U.S.C. (1976)).
103. Smith-Lever Act, ch. 79, Pub. L. No. 95, 38 Stat. 372 (1914) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§
341-349 (1976)).
104. The exception was the Sheppard-Towner Act, Pub. L. No. 97, 42 Stat. 224 (1921) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 161-175), which provided federal funds for state programs designed to improve
maternal and child health. Congress allowed the law to expire in 1929.
105. Emergency Relief and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 302, 47 Stat. 709 (1932) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 605a; repealed 1947).
106. Wagner-Peyser Act, Pub. L. No. 30, 48 Stat. 113 (1933) (codified as amended 19 U.S.C.
§ 49 (1976)).
107. H. BrrERMANN, supra note 98, at 343-69.
108. W. Htns?, supra note 2.
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only the federal government commanded the fiscal resources to deal with
them adequately. At the same time, grant-in-aid programs avoided the
expansion of an even larger federal bureaucracy and left many critical
administrative decisions in the hands of state and local officials.
Through the grant-in-aid programs and other means, state and local
elites often played a major role in the implementation of New Deal mea-
sures. This, in turn, created complex patterns of political decision-mak-
ing that refuted simplistic ideas about rampant centralization in the fed-
eral bureaucracy. For example, although the federal government paid for
the popular Civilian Conservation Corps, state welfare administrators se-
lected the 500,000 men who received jobs, and set the agenda for CCC
projects. 109 Similarly, the heart of the New Deal's farm program, the do-
mestic allotment system, vested important decisions in the hands of
county committees composed of farmers and extension-service personnel
chosen by local notables.110 The Taylor Grazing Act"' gave similar
power to livestock ranchers, whose rulings determined the extent of graz-
ing rights on the vast public lands of the Western states. The New Deal
may have spawned a new bureaucratic elite in Washington, but it usually
left intact and sometimes strengthened the local power structure by refi-
nancing it or buttressing its activities with federal law.
New Deal reformers who challenged the prerogatives of local elites
usually provoked instant political protest and retaliation. Roosevelt hast-
ily dismantled the innovative Civil Works Administration in 1934, be-
cause it drew intense opposition from governors, county supervisors, and
mayors. These local officials objected to the complete federalization of its
extensive work-relief efforts. Later, the WPA program gave a larger
voice in decision-making to these officials, who systematically used the
WPA machinery to punish their political enemies and to discriminate
against racial minorities.11 2 When idealistic lawyers in the AAA, led by
Alger Hiss, Jerome Frank, and Lee Pressman, attempted to protect share-
croppers and tenants from eviction in the South under the cover of the
administration's farm program, they stirred up a grass-roots revolt among
the prosperous commercial farmers and landowners. Roosevelt and his
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, sided with the local power
109. J. CLARK, supra note 97, at 92-93.
110. R. KIRKENDALL, SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND FARM POLICIES IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1966)
V. PERKINS, CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE: THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION AND THlE NE\
DEAL, 1933 (1969).
111. Taylor Grazing Act, Pub. L. No. 482. 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified in scattered sectior
of 43 U.S.C. (1976)).
112. Fishel, The Negro in the New Deal Era. 48 WIS. MAG. HIST 111-23 (1964).
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structure. 113 Likewise, much of the opposition to the New Deal after 1935
among Southern Democrats flowed from two sources: first, the fear that
the National Labor Relations Board would speed the unionization of in-
dustrial workers in the region; and second, anger at the Department of
Justice for resurrecting the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes in an
attempt to protect Negroes from local violence.
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE NEW DEAL
The reforms of the New Deal did little to dislodge Southern racial atti-
tudes because of Roosevelt's own indifference, the strength of the party's
southern wing in the Congress, and the absence of a viable tradition of
civil rights enforcement in the Department of Justice. FDR refused to en-
dorse a federal anti-lynching law, although his wife, Eleanor, and many
administration leaders vocally supported it. Not until the end of the dec-
ade did Attorney General Frank Murphy, the former governor of Michi-
gan, launch a civil rights division in his department. This change brought
the executive branch into the civil rights field for the first time since the
1870's. In addition to initiating the landmark prosecution against elec-
toral fraud in Louisiana,,114 Murphy's small but dedicated staff began in-
dictments against a Georgia policeman charged with torturing a-black
man to obtain a confession, and against a group of Alabama vigilantes,
who had infringed the right of free speech and press of a local newspaper
editor. 115 Given its meagre funding, inadequate personnel, and lack of
clear legal precedents, the department began to prosecute the most fla-
grant examples of Southern racism, but failed to modify the day-to-day
patterns of violence, intimidation, and discrimination.
Despite the New Deal's failure to eradicate the most glaring examples
of local injustice and racial oppression in- the South, the decade of the
Great Depression witnessed a revitalization of American federalism,
which strengthened the institutions of both national and local govern-
ment. It was not a federalism without tension, especially when reformers
in Washington challenged entrenched local customs and power relation-
113. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OFTHE NEW DEAL 77-81 (1959); D. GRUBBS, CRY FROM
THE COTTON; THE SOUTHERN TENANT FARMERS' UNION AND THE NEW DEAL (1971).
114. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
115. The extent of New' Deal activism in the civil rights area has been often underestimated due
to FDR's rhetorical silence. But the administration commenced an extensive federal prosecution
against the notorious Pendergast machine in Kansas City for civil rights violations in the 1936 presi-
dential election; brought suit against more than twenty coal companies in Harlan County, Kentucky
for conspiring to prevent their employees from exercising their rights under the Wagner Act; And put
new teeth into the federal anti-peonage statutes. The New Deal's record is brilliantly set forth in
Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United
States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741-815 (1981).
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ships, but tension had been a basic theme of federal-state relations since
the era of George Washington. By 1940, the federal government enjoyed
undoubted fiscal and legal supremacy over the states, but the routine in-
terpretation and application of national laws often remained in the hands
of more parochial officials, who often tailored them to local habits and
conditions. Many important areas of public law-especially labor rela-
tions and corporate finance-became largely a prerogative of the national
government as a result of New Deal legislation, but others remained
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states, including insurance regula-
tion, zoning and property law, marriage and divorce, and business incor-
poration. At the same time that it affirmed the broad authority of the na-
tional government over important economic policy questions in cases
such as Jones & Laughlin1 6 and Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 117 the
Supreme Court overturned a century of precedent in Erie v. Tompkins" 18
to give greater recognition to state law in disputes arising in the federal
courts through diversity jurisdiction. 19
Brandeis' opinion in Erie struck a blow for local autonomy and varia-
tion in the vast domain of private law, but the states, ironically, were
moving in the opposite direction under the influence of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute. By the end of the depression decade, the states had adopted over
400 uniform statutes, covering areas of commercial law, property, and
civil procedure. 120
The American Law Institute had been founded in 1923 by elite lawyers
and jurists who feared for the consistency of the common law in a nation
of 48 states and who also hoped to curb the radical innovations in doctrine
advanced by several state courts. 121 Through the publications of its vari-
ous Restatements, (the first of which, on the law of contracts, appeared in
1932122) the Institute became a potent force for uniform application and
116. See supra note 42.
117. 301 U.S. 528 (1937) (upholding the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social
Security Act of 1935).
118. 304U.S.64(1938).
119. Erie overruled the venerable case of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which
permitted federal judges to apply federal rather than state common law to matters not covered by state
statutes. Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter and others believed that Swift placed unnecessary power in
the federal courts and benefitted only the giant corporations who exploited diversity jurisdiction to
escape local regulations. They had often urged Congress to modify the rule, but without success.
When Congress failed to act, Brandeis used the occasion of the Erie case finally to bury the rule of
Swift v. Tyson, although neither party to the litigation had asked the Court to do so.
120. W.B. GRAVES, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT 854-72 (1953); Mott, Uniform Legislation
in the United States, 89 ANNALS 79-92 (1940); Rossman, Uniformity of Law: An Elusive Goal. 76
A.B.A.J. 175-78,258-59(1950).
121. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 67-69 (1974).
122. G. GILMORE, supra note 121, at 55-60; B. GRAVES, supra note 120, at 859.
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interpretation of the common law. Its publications eventually covered
trusts, property, agency, and torts. In 1939, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted that it could find only a single instance in the recent past
when it had not followed the applicable rule of law as set down in the
Restatement of Contracts. 123 Obviously, not all of the uniformity brought
to the American legal order during the 1930's arose from the machina-
tions of subversive New Dealers in Washington. In the case of the Ameri-
can Law Institute, legal conservatives carried out a successful counter-
revolution against those deviant jurists who threatened the symmetry of
the common law rules through idiosyncratic rulings often rooted in local
traditions and customs.
THE MATURING OF STATE CAPITALISM
The maturing of state capitalism was another important change arising
from the legal reforms of the New Deal. Roosevelt and his advisers did
not hesitate to employ the law in an effort to provide a more secure envi-
ronment for laborers, farmers, the elderly, and the unemployed. Never-
theless, they offered many benefits to the nation's capitalists as well.
While business opposition to FDR was frequently intense, it was nar-
rowly based in such labor-intensive industries as textiles, automobiles,
and steel, which had the most to lose from collective bargaining. The
adminsitration's tax reform measures likewise generated bitter opposition
from wealthy families such as the DuPonts, the Pews, and the Mellons.
At the same time, the New Deal found many business allies among com-
panies in the growing service industries of banking, insurance, and stock
brokerage, where government regulation promised more stable profits
and a reduction in cutthroat competition. 12 4 And because of its aggressive
policies to expand American exports and investment opportunities
abroad, the administration drew support from emerging high-technology
firms such as IBM and from the international oil companies, which were
anxious to break the British monopoly in the Middle East. 125
Sophisticated businessmen such as Gerard Swope, Averell Harriman,
Walter Teagle, and Sidney Wineberg discovered that they could live quite
comfortably in a world of government regulation. The "socialist" Ten-
nessee Valley Authority lowered the profits of a few over-extended utility
123. B. GRAvES. supra note 120, at 860.
124. The restructured Reconstruction Finance Corporation, for example, provided a needed infu-
sion of capital into the banking system by purchasing the preferred stock of many institutions on the
edge of collapse. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 113, at 431-33.
125. L. GARDNER, ECONOMIC ASPEcTS OF NEw DEAL DIPLOMACY (1964); Ferguson, From Nor-
malcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the
Great Depression (unpublished manuscript).
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companies, but its campaign to bring cheap electric power to the rural
South translated into larger consumer markets for the manufacturers of
generators, refrigerators, fans, and other appliances. 126 The SEC, in addi-
tion to restoring public confidence in the stock exchanges and the securi-
ties industry generally, encouraged self-regulation among over-the-coun-
ter dealers, gave large brokerage houses such as Merrill Lynch greater
influence in the governance of the exchanges, and allowed accountants to
play a decisive role in the regulatory process with respect to financial re-
porting and disclosure requirements. 127 The Interstate Commerce Com-
mision aided the motor-trucking firms in their efforts to reduce competi-
tion, just as the new Civil Aeronautics Authority protected the major
airlines from the rigors of the market place. 128 Despite its brief flirtation
with an aggressive antitrust policy in 1938-39, the New Deal's basic im-
pact upon the nation's industrial structure was in the direction of further
cartelization and closer business-government cooperation, a process in-
tensified by the demands of economic mobilization during the Second
World War.
THE GALVANIZATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The New Deal had an equally profound impact upon the structure and
values of the American legal profession. Businessmen flocked to Wash-
ington during the war, but the lawyers preceded them. The New Deal, as
Jerold Auerbach observed, was above all "a lawyer's deal,"' 129 whose
achievements rested ultimately upon the skills of this profession in nego-
tiation, legislative drafting, administration, and litigation. Unable to win
the support of traditional leaders, whose careers and income remained
closely tied to hostile business and financial groups, the New Deal
fashioned a new, counter-elite of lawyers to draft, implement and defend
its laws.
Many of the so-called "New Deal lawyers," including Jerome Frank,
Robert Jackson, Ben Cohen, and Francis Biddle, abandoned prosperous,
established practices to begin government service. They did so for a vari-
ety of reasons, ranging from a desire to reform existing social institutions
to simple boredom. Private practice no longer satisfied him, Biddle re-
126. T. MCGRAW. TVA ANDTHE POWER FIGHT. 1933-1939 (1971): C. PRITCHET-. TIIETENNES-
SEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1943).
127. M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL (1970): J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MOD-
ERN CORPORATE FINANCE 125-240 (1982).
128. E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 232-34. 240-44 (!966).
129. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA
191-230(1976).
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marked, because "there was little dedication to ends beyond monetary
rewards for the narrower needs of self." 130 A larger contingent of lawyers
was composed of younger men, many of them fresh from the country's
premier law schools, who came to Washington in search of steady em-
ployment and often with a desire to make the world over. They were, in
the memorable phrase of George Peek, who distrusted them, "boys with
their hair ablaze. "131 Felix Frankfurter, who recruited many of them, be-
lieved they were "the best men of the graduating classes of the leading
law schools," who were "freed from complicated ramifications of pri-
vate life ... diverted by a minimum of vanities and jealousies ... more
resilient, more cooperative in taking orders.., on the whole much better
than... the generation that preceded [them]." 132
In truth, Frankfurter's young lawyers did not seem to be noticeably
more cooperative, more resilient, less vain, or less petty than the lawyers
who came before them. But whether they were more mature, established
attorneys or recent products of Harvard, Yale, and Columbia, the New
Deal lawyers did share one trait-they were usually outsiders. They did
not quite fit the traditional mold of the legal establishment, either because
of their ideas, their social background, or their ethnocultural heritage.
This was true of Robert Jackson, who had never graduated from law
school and who idealized the solo practitioners of nineteenth century
legend; of Jerome Frank, the intellectual founder of legal realism; and of
William 0. Douglas, the iconoclast from Yakima, Washington, who
herded sheep and ate in hobo jungles before attending law school, joining
a Wall Street firm, and teaching at Yale. It was certainly true of the nu-
merous young Jewish lawyers such as Nathan Margold, Abe Fortas, and
Nathan Witt, who found the traditional avenues of success through pri-
vate practice and academia closed off because of the depressed economy
and anti-Semitism.
The New Deal drew its dynamism from such individuals, because the
New Deal was a coalition of minorities-social, ethnic, regional, and in-
tellectual-which Roosevelt forged into a new governing majority. The
administration gave influence, status, and recognition for the first time to
those who had been excluded from full participation in the nation's power
structure before the Great Depression-Irish Catholics, Jews, Eastern Eu-
ropeans, white Southerners, women, and Negroes. Roosevelt appointed
the first woman cabinet member, Frances Perkins, and the first Roman
Catholic Solicitor General, Charles Fahy. The New Deal became the po-
litical home for those already made such as Joseph P. Kennedy, the Bos-
130. Id. at 174.
131. See the splendid account in P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
132. F. FRANKFURTER, LAWAND POLITICS, 238-49 (1956).
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ton millionaire, and Marriner Eccles, the upstart Mormon banker from
Utah, as well as for those on the way up, such as the Reuther brothers,
Sidney Hillman, and Lyndon B. Johnson.
As both Auerbach133 and Peter Irons 34 have noted, the zeal of these
New Deal lawyers for fundamental social change was usually tempered
by political realities and by their own professional training, which valued
compromise and technical prowess much more than revolution or "cor-
rect" ideology. Legal technique often triumphed over legal reform. Not a
few New Deal lawyers, who earned their reputations fighting economic
royalists during the 1930's, became ensconced in their own wealthy law
firms by the 1950's, where they served many of their former antagonists.
Upon reflection, these defections seem prefigured by the New Deal law-
yers' personal and professional personalities. The typical New Deal law-
yer was the hard-boiled, cynical, wise-cracking Tommy Corcoran or
Thurman Arnold, not the gentle, idealistic Ben Cohen.
That the New Deal lawyers did not in the end transform their profes-
sion's ethics or dominant passions is hardly surprising when one consid-
ers that neither they nor the administration they served wished to break
decisively with the American past. Theirs was a mandate only to improve
a legal order that had long placed private interests above public ones and
that had been preoccupied for a century with economic growth at the ex-
pense of economic justice. The New Deal at least began to redress that
ancient imbalance in our legal culture. "The thing I remember most about
those times," noted Charles Horsky, who served in the office of the soli-
citor general, "is the esprit de corps, the sense that we were doing some-
thing worthwhile .... We felt we were going to change the United States
and make it a better place. And we did, damn it, we did." 135
Because of the reforms sponsored by the New Deal between 1933 and
1939, the American legal order was more just, equitable, and efficient at
the end of the decade than at its beginning. As a result of the "constitu-
tional revolution" in 1937, the personal liberty protected by the nation's
fundamental law amounted to more than the empty freedom to work for
subsistence wages under a "yellow-dog" contract with little prospect of
economic security during retirement. As a consequence of the growth of
presidential power, the one public official elected by all of the people was
finally given the mandate and the institutional tools to make decisions on
behalf of the broadest possible conception of the public interest. The ster-
ile "dual federalism" of the past, which often left both national and local
government impotent in the face of serious economic and social
133. See supra note 129.
134. See supra note 131.
135. K. LOUCHHEIM, supra note 1, at 88.
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problems, gave way to a more energetic, cooperative federalism, which
utilized the vast fiscal resources of Washington, yet preserved local diver-
sity and initiative with respect to implementing policy. The new legal
framework of state capitalism offered businessmen greater stability and
predictability in the marketplace in exchange for giving labor, consum-
ers, investors, and the general public a greater voice in corporate affairs.
And the legal profession, long dominated by the intellectual traditions of
the common law and the social values associated with commercial-corpo-
rate practice, experienced a fresh infusion of ideas and personnel gener-
ated by the growth of administrative law, the overhauling of law school
curricula by the legal realists, and the creation of new professional oppor-
tunities for racial and ethnic minority groups.
By any reckoning, these were impressive and healthy developments
that reflected well upon the extraordinary capacity of the American legal
system and its political institutions to initiate and accommodate far-reach-
ing changes with a modicum of violence and bloodshed. But the New
Deal's legal balance sheet contained its share of debits as well as credits.
The nation's more benevolent legal order was also far more complicated
and remote from popular influence than ever before. Enormous power
and discretion had now been vested in a handful of institutions-the
White House, executive departments, selected Congressional commit-
tees, federal courts, and the permanent bureaucracy-where small cadres
of legal mandarins attempted to insure economic prosperity and security
for a society of 130 million people. The average citizen retained his abso-
lute right every two, four, or six years to "kick the rascals out," but
increasingly, many of the critical decisions about his economic welfare-
everything from interest rates to the price of steel-were made by ap-
pointed, highly-specialized technicians. Without a lobbyist, without a
lawyer, without some rudimentary knowledge of the substance and pro-
cedures of administrative law, the average citizen had little capacity to
shape the decisions of government that affected his daily life. A compas-
sionate government was also at times a large, impenetrable, and imper-
sonal government, a disease that plagued not only Washington, but the
state capitals and city halls of America as well. The result by the end of
the decade was an unmistakable trend of voter apathy, indifference, and
cynicism that reached epidemic proportions by the 1980's.
Without a substantial increase in presidential power, it is doubtful that
the country could have surmounted the decade's economic trauma or later
withstood the challenges posed by the aggressive nationalisms of Nazi
Germany and Imperial Japan. An "imperial presidency," one which
sometimes tested the limits of constitutional authority, was a blessing
during the 1930's in a country weakened by depression, doubt, and
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military vulnerability. Roosevelt's successors, however, often used his
precedents for less benign purposes. In a nation that enjoyed virtual eco-
nomic hegemony throughout the world and that possessed a monopoly of
nuclear weapons, an "imperial presidency" could become both a threat
to domestic civil liberties and a menace to the human race. By generally
accepting the racial status quo in America, Roosevelt and the New Deal-
ers secured the cooperation of the white South in their efforts to promote
domestic reforms and prepare the country for war. Economic recovery,
and, later, rearmament, took priority over fighting segregation and disen-
franchisement in Alabama and Mississippi. But in making this choice,
FDR and the New Dealers not only failed to address the nation's most
serious moral question, they also guaranteed that when the issue was
faced, it would be in the context of a much longer legacy of frustration,
bitterness, and fear.
With the exception of the abolition of slavery during the Civil War, the
New Deal remains the closest we have come in this country to a funda-
mental restructuring of our economic and legal system, where the rules of
public and private law and the apparatus of the state have been devoted
usually to economic expansion, profit-maximization, and the defense of
property rights at the expense of other human rights. At the conclusion of
the New Deal, the rules of law no longer favored capital as blatantly as in
the past. The state served more than the interests of big business. But
instead of popular government, we had government by bureaucratic
elites; instead of genuine social democracy, we had state capitalism and
the smallest welfare state among the industrial nations of the West. The
social philosopher may wish for more profound changes. The historian,
however, realizes that such may not have been possible given the habits
and traditions of the American people, their particular mood during the
1930's, and the limitations of those they chose to lead the nation.
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